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per scientiam ad justitiam
magnus hirschfeld’s episteme of biological publicity
Kevin S. Amidon

Introduction in Jena
In December 1912, Charles Sedgwick Minot, LL.D., D.Sc. (Oxon.), professor of
comparative anatomy and director of the Anatomical Laboratories at the Harvard
Medical School, presented a series of six lectures at the University of Jena in Germany, where he was exchange professor at the time. Jena held a leading position
among centers of research in the biological sciences, based largely on the vigorous
activity of Ernst Haeckel (1834–1919) and colleagues and students including Carl
Gegenbaur, Oscar Hertwig, Wilhelm Roux, and Julius Schaxel. When published in
English, Minot’s lectures bore the general title Modern Problems of Biology, and were
clearly pitched by the publisher toward an audience that reached beyond specialists
in the life sciences. Minot’s goals therefore encompassed forms of persuasive argument meant to demonstrate the significance and power of the life sciences through
broad intellectual, social, and even political impact. In this intention he paralleled
Haeckel and his Jena colleagues. His published lectures therefore provide a concise
demonstration of the conceptual scope of the concept “biology” across national
boundaries in the period around the turn of the twentieth century.
As was the case for many of his contemporaries, the term “biology” meant many
things to Minot, which led him to make wide-ranging predictions about the bright
future of the field. Biology’s disciplinary diversity also had a downside, however,
which he saw as the fragmentation of scientific inquiry into life. In the crowning
sixth lecture of his series, entitled “The Conception of Life,” he addressed these
concerns: “Unfortunately, biology has not yet become a united science, but consists of sundry disciplines more or less separated from one another.” All of these
“sundry disciplines,” however, which included both the longer-standing descriptive
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and classificatory fields of anatomy, botany, and zoology as well as the newer, more
specialized, and mechanistic discipline of physiology, had the potential to become
integrated through the concept “biology.” Minot’s vision of biology was therefore
one in which “true and real biology” and “unified biological science” would be one
and the same. Furthermore, Minot spoke assuredly of the integrated biology of the
future as the dominant mode of scientific inquiry. Biology would achieve its crowning persuasive position through publicity both within and beyond disciplinary
boundaries in the sciences: “This more complete biology of the future will I believe
be recognized by all as the supreme science.”
“Complete” biological science further held, in Minot’s argument, the potential
to explain complex questions of human understanding and behavior. “Consciousness, the relation of the soul to the body, the origin of reason, the relations of the
external world to psychical perception, and most subjects of philosophical thought
are fundamentally biological phenomena which the naturalist investigates and analyzes.” Few of his contemporary investigators in the German biological field would
have disagreed, and few would have refrained from attempting to persuade others
that biology held this potential. Recent scholarship, especially that of Lynn Nyhart,
has emphasized the centrality of this publicistic element in German biological discourse around 1900. In speaking to a German audience in Jena, then still in the
immediate post-Haeckel era, Minot surely believed that his claims would fall on
receptive ears. Countless German scholars and commentators of 1912 would have
fully supported his characterization of biology as a science that culminated most
significantly in normative claims about human phenomena and behavior. Particularly in its German iteration, but also outside of Germany wherever German
methods and training were valued highly, like the United States, the term “biology”
therefore encompassed investigational techniques and methods, but also, and in
many ways more importantly, the use of conclusions drawn from those investigations to make persuasive claims about social, political, and intellectual phenomena oriented well beyond the disciplinary boundaries of biological inquiry. These
claims themselves became the basis for intervention-oriented disciplinary moves
and movements like hygiene, eugenics, and the many forms of sex research—and
especially that of Magnus Hirschfeld, which encompassed all of these spheres. German biological science in 1912 was thus more significantly shaped by its practices of
persuasion than by its forms and strategies of investigation. In most cases this persuasion was oriented toward print publics but also took place through varied disciplinary networks, including textual and visual forms of persuasion and publicity.
Biology was therefore a set of networked, competing epistemes of investigational
and publicistic intervention.
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Minot, as an American scientist speaking at a German university with a particularly distinguished tradition in several biological disciplines, thus reveals the
central conceptual conflict that marked the development of scientific inquiry into
living things in Germany in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries:
the uncomfortable relationship between the two modes of scientific practice that
I would like to name here investigational practice and persuasive practice. Simply
put, investigational practice involves the observation of living phenomena with the
tools of scientific inquiry: microscopes, stains, microtomes, preserved specimens,
experimental populations of flies, moths, or butterflies—a vast and limitless range
of proliferating objects of investigation. Persuasive practice encompasses the forms
of communication used to disseminate scientists’ claims, both within and beyond
the fluid boundaries of disciplinary categories. It can therefore take the form not
just of written, spoken, or printed words, but also of constructed representations:
drawings, models, exhibitions, collection methods, even photographs. Persuasive
practice can therefore relate either tightly or loosely to investigational practice.
Where it becomes particularly loosely related to investigation, it becomes what so
many commentators, Andreas Daum most sophisticated among them, have called
“popularization.”
Minot demonstrates two common strategies among scientists of the day that
show the dynamic relationships between investigational and persuasive practice.
First, he frames his persuasive claims passively, often as speculations about future
consensus: “Complete biology . . . will . . . be recognized by all.” This assumes that
something will happen that will in fact be persuasive to future individuals, whether
they work within a discipline or not. Second, he attempts to subordinate or mask
some of his persuasive claims by foregrounding investigational practice. He even
claims that it is “by application of the microscope” that clarity of thought, investigation, and discovery can be attained. Minot thus demonstrates how biological
scientists always had to negotiate both investigational and persuasive practice at the
same time. In many cases they held interests that motivated them to subordinate
one to the other. Some scientists chose to focus their efforts closely on investigation
and to attempt to link persuasion ever more closely to it. Most German scientists in
the biological field around 1900 did precisely the opposite. They built grand persuasive edifices and subdisciplinary fiefs on minimal investigational results. Until after
World War II, disciplinary development and institutionalization in German biology thus generally tracked modes and strategies of persuasive practice more closely
than techniques and methods of investigation. This duality had as a consequence
an almost limitless proliferation of prefixes or modifiers to the term biology. Race
biology, social biology, cultural biology, chemical biology, criminal biology, sexual
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biology, holistic biology, biological medicine—all of these terms represented moves
toward disciplinization in the German academic and research system around 1900
that built large structures of persuasive practice directed toward nondisciplinary
audiences out of often very narrow investigational results. So pervasive was this
proliferation of biologies in Germany at the time that the term “biology” itself can
be read most generally as a marker of the pursuit of control over social and political
advocacy by groups of subdisciplinary investigators of varying prestige and social
interests. Magnus Hirschfeld’s investigational and persuasive practices represent
with extraordinary depth and scope this protean character of discursive and institutional field of biology.

Magnus Hirschfeld and the Biological Science of Sociopolitical Intervention
In the months before Minot’s residence in Jena, Hirschfeld had engaged in two
significant publicistic interventions into the print and personal networks of publicity that constituted German scientific discourse: he had published a major book,
Naturgesetze der Liebe: Eine gemeinverständliche Untersuchung über den LiebesEindruck, Liebes-Drang und Liebes-Ausdruck (Natural Laws of Love: A Generally Understandable Study of the Impressions, Drives, and Expressions of Love)
and participated in the second (1912) Magdeburg congress of the German Monist
League, the popularizing scientific-philosophical organization founded in the service of the ideas of Ernst Haeckel. As Todd Weir has argued in his extensive work
on monism in this period, monism provided a range of scholars and commentators, both within and beyond university contexts, with institutional forum for
arguments and discussions linking biology and politics through concepts marked
as “biological.” Hirschfeld’s varied forms of scientific and publicistic practice, and
especially his publications and short-lived but energetic engagement with monism,
therefore provide a nuanced case study of the discursive valences of the biological
field at the time. Hirschfeld identified himself as a biologist, dedicating Natural
Laws of Love to Ernst Haeckel, and stating unequivocally in the introduction to his
1914 magnum opus Die Homosexualität des Mannes und des Weibes (The Homosexuality of Men and Women) that he sought to study human beings upon “the only
possible natural, biological-anthropological basis.” He therefore engaged willingly
and energetically throughout his varied career by both rhetorical and investigational means with disciplinary, subdisciplinary, and what we might now think of
as pseudodisciplinary popularizing fields, including endocrine research, heredity,
eugenics, psychoanalysis, monism, and evolution. He embodied with striking scale,
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scope, and density the interventionist episteme of the German biological field in
the first decades of the twentieth century.
Hirschfeld’s work was driven from its first publicistically effective moments in
the 1890s by a complex and labile set of personal and political investments. He
rapidly became well known for his theory of “sexual intermediates” and his efforts
for the repeal of paragraph 175 of the Imperial German Penal Code. He nonetheless
remained pragmatically circumspect in many debates about whether homosexuality represented a natural pathological development or a dangerous phenomenon
of degeneration. Beginning in 1899 he edited the Jahrbuch für sexuelle Zwischenstufen (Yearbook for Sexual Intermediaries), and in the first years of the twentieth
century he published a number of significant tracts, both popular monographs and
large academic articles, that elaborated on his theory of sexual intermediates and
the ways that sexual behavior, particularly in urban settings like Berlin, revealed
them. The most significant of these publications included “Ursachen und Wesen
des Uranismus” (Causes and Character of Uranism [Male Homosexuality]; 1903),
Der urnische Mensch (The Uranian [Male Homosexual] Person; 1903), Berlins drittes
Geschlecht (Berlin’s Third Sex; 1904), and Geschlechtsübergänge (Sexual Transitions;
1904/1905). He achieved particular notoriety for his testimony in 1908 during the
series of criminal and civil trials known as the Harden-Eulenburg affair, in which
a circle of close friends and advisers of Kaiser Wilhelm II, including Prince Phillip zu Eulenburg-Hertefeld and Kuno von Moltke, became embroiled in a dense
thicket of accusations of homosexuality and counteraccusations of defamation.
Soon after the Eulenburg scandal he published his three largest and most famous
monographs: Die Transvestiten (The Transvestites; 1910), Naturgesetze der Liebe
(Natural Laws of Love; 1912), and Die Homosexualität des Mannes und des Weibes
(The Homosexuality of Men and Women; 1914).

Hirschfeld’s Scientific Constellation of Text and Image
Hirschfeld’s representations of his work in print generally centered around case
narratives, though, as Kathrin Peters explains in this volume, he always found both
visual and narrative evidence useful. The case narratives around which he builds his
arguments are often dozens of pages long. He relied particularly on extensive narratives of individual sexual life stories gleaned from thousands of “psycho-biological
questionnaires”—a form of survey research that he developed. He pulled together
patients’ responses to questions about their childhood, their sexual desires, their
habits of dress, and physical comportment to weave long narrative case studies. He
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employed similar narratives in all of his subsequent writings. His “Ursachen und
Wesen des Uranismus” (1903), for example, contains numerous lengthy quotations
from individual narratives as well as a thirty-four-page appendix entitled “life story
of the Uranian [homosexual] worker S., as told in his own words.” Nonetheless,
in a rhetorical trope found commonly in the biological and psychological literature
of the time, Hirschfeld’s rhetoric in “Ursachen” also regularly couches conclusions
drawn from narrative representation in visual metaphor: “We see in this case”;
“We thus see here,” suggesting that the traits could be literally seen by readers.
Hirschfeld was drawing upon the practices of clinical demonstration, common in
all medical fields since the middle of the nineteenth century, and in precisely following these conventions, he sought to present his research as objectively observable
fact to a scientific audience. He interpretively concludes nine pages of narratives
from homosexuals about their childhoods with the words “these true-to-life reflections, selected from a large number of similar ones, grant most valuable insight into
the psychology of the Uranian [homosexual] child-soul.” Hirschfeld thus embeds
a combination of visual-diagnostic interpretation and textual-narrative explication
at the deepest level of his rhetoric.
Hirschfeld also wrote an epilogue to one of the most significant memoirs about
sexual identity of his day, Aus eines Mannes Mädchenjahren (Memoirs of a Man’s
Maiden Years) by Karl Baer (1885–1956), who published the work under the pseudonym “N. O. Body” in 1907. Baer had been assigned a female gender in childhood because he had physiologically ambiguous genitalia. He eventually declared
his gender identity to be male. Visual surveillance forced his gender transition as
well. Beginning in late adolescence he was regularly suspected by police of being
a man dressed as a woman, which was a crime in many European jurisdictions.
Hirschfeld’s summary of the case repeated the visual rhetoric he deployed in “Ursachen” in 1903 and developed in Geschlechtsübergänge in 1904/1905:
We see here how far-reaching conflicts may occur already in the souls of children, certainly an instructive example for our times in which we, unfortunately, have far too
many occasions to read of suicides committed by schoolchildren and other tragedies
involving children. . . . We further see an absolutely classical example of the struggle
between a congenital disposition and external influences, between the inherited and the
acquired. We observe how, with elemental force, certain inner impulses break through
barriers that education and environment have erected, and how in spite of everything,
in the end it is the spirit that molds life.

Not only does this summary emphasize the links between visualization and narra-
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tive, but it prefigures Hirschfeld’s testimony just months later during the HardenEulenburg affair by highlighting tensions between “inherited” traits, unconscious
“disposition,” conscious or “acquired” behavior, and observable “external influences.”
In the earlier stages of Hirschfeld’s career, the technique of the case history generally took precedence over visual evidence. Later, he tended to deploy a greater
range of visual material. This apparent shift in his practice took place for three
reasons, which together reveal the interlacing of scientific-investigational and publicistic elements and motivations in his work. The first is that between Hirschfeld’s
first publications combining description of and advocacy about homosexuality in
the 1890s and the publication of his multivolume medical textbooks in the 1920s
and 1930s, printing technology advanced rapidly, and made possible the inclusion
of large numbers of high-resolution glossy plates in reasonably priced publications.
Second, microscopic, cellular, and biochemical techniques for linking behavioral
and physiological phenomena through investigation of the endocrine system also
advanced rapidly in the first three decades of the twentieth century, and Hirschfeld
often sought to make reference to recent innovations in biological-scientific practices in his work. Third, Hirschfeld’s own varying, but generally increasing professional and disciplinary status (especially as the director of his own institute after
1919) made it possible for him to frame his publications in the style of authoritative
textbooks collecting authorized medical-biological knowledge, rather than scholarly or popularizing works promulgating his own arguments and positions. His
Die Homosexualität des Mannes und des Weibes (The Homosexuality of Men and
Women; 1914) can be seen as a transitional work between these two publication
styles—part scholarship-advocacy and part textbook. Revealingly, the circa onethousand-page book contains no visual images.
The initial publication of Richard von Krafft-Ebing’s Psychopathia Sexualis in
1886 and its subsequent success as a biomedical “best seller” cemented the growing
position of the narrative case history as the primary means of medical and scientific access to the relationships between behavior, identity, and pathology. The
fraught and still controversial field of psychoanalysis, with its focus on the invisible
phenomena of the unconscious accessible through the process of a “talking cure,”
demonstrates particularly clearly how constructed narratives became central to scientific and scholarly practice at the time. For a few years around 1910, Hirschfeld
was regularly in contact with Sigmund Freud and the growing psychoanalytic
movement. Like Hirschfeld, Freud regularly analyzed individuals not just through
a “talking cure,” but also through an examination of their memoirs and other texts.
The most famous of these was his extensive monograph on the 1903 book Memoirs
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of My Nervous Illness by the judge Daniel Paul Schreber, who believed himself to be
turning into a woman.
Analogously to Freud, Hirschfeld in several of his most significant works published between 1903 and 1914 chose to emphasize narrative case studies of homosexuals and those we would now call intersex individuals and their behavior. He did
begin to explore the use of photography as evidence for his claims during this period
but generally expanded visual material into case study-based narratives and theoretical structures in his major published works. As Kathrin Peters argues in this volume, Hirschfeld’s practice of using images in his early study Geschlechtsübergänge
(Sexual Transitions, 1904/1905) was ambiguous. On the one hand, he saw photography as a medium that objectively documented reality. But a closer examination
of the photographs he used—most of which did not come from medical or scientific sources—and his practices of photographic documentation reveals that these
images constructed sexual difference in very specific ways. Furthermore, as David
James Prickett has emphasized, Hirschfeld’s work (in Geschlechtsübergänge) shows
“reliance on written and visual testimony of hermaphrodites and homosexuals.”
This constellation of textual and visual elements characterized Hirschfeld’s work for
the remainder of his career, including in his large multivolume works Sexualpathologie (Sexual Pathology; 1916–20) and Geschlechtskunde (Sex and Sexuality Studies;
1926–30). Beginning around 1914, however, new endocrinological methods and
microscopic techniques induced Hirschfeld to consider more deeply how visual
evidence for the characterization sexual difference could serve his arguments about
sexual self-understanding and pathology. All through these shifts in his practice,
Hirschfeld claimed biology as his primary field of investigation.
Hirschfeld, of course, understood the strategies of subdisciplinary conflict and
appropriation only too well, at least after his bruising experience with the politics
of homosexuality in the Harden-Eulenburg affair. He followed the general tendency toward disciplinary cross-fertilization and cross-appropriation in scientific
research, and his work shares much with what Atina Grossmann has called the
“motherhood-eugenics consensus”—the widespread conviction that eugenic ideas
had to guide scientific investigations of sex, sexuality, and reproduction. Eugenics
also was often known in Germany under the more specific term “race hygiene,” or
Rassenhygiene (see below). Hirschfeld logically preferred the Anglo-Greek term
Eugenik, coined originally by Francis Galton, rather than the Germanization “race
hygiene.” In 1913 at the time that Hirschfeld was working extensively to expand
his reputation, he, Max Marcuse, and Albert Eulenburg founded the Ärztliche
Gesellschaft für Sexualwissenschaft (Medical Society for Sex Research). They added
“und Eugenik” to its name just months after its founding. The organization did not
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become highly effective in its efforts to promote what the founders suggested were
acceptable sexual and reproductive practices. Nonetheless, Hirschfeld never lost
his enthusiasm for the potential of positive eugenics.
Particularly after the foundation of Hirschfeld’s Institute for Sexual Science
in 1919, his work grew to incorporate a wider range of visual material. Between
1916 and 1920 he published his three-volume textbook Sexualpathologie (Sexual
Pathology), in which the entire second volume treated “intermediate sexual forms.”
During and after World War I, Hirschfeld became particularly interested in the
work of the Viennese physician Eugen Steinach, who experimented in the early
1920s with the transplantation of testes as therapy for homosexuality. (For a more
detailed discussion of the popularization of Steinach’s work in film, see the contribution of Rainer Herrn and Christine N. Brinckmann to this volume). Steinach
explored glandular explanations for the development of the intermediate sexual
forms that Hirschfeld believed to be the basis for homosexual behavior. Experience
with research like Steinach’s led Hirschfeld to rely less on the complex narrative case
studies that had characterized the earlier stages of his research because he increasingly came to believe that the etiology of homosexuality could in fact be visualized,
including microscopically. Between 1926 and 1930, he published his richly illustrated five-volume Geschlechtskunde (Sexual Knowledge). The entire fourth volume
was filled with plates, drawings, and illustrations ranging from drawings of microscopic observations of cellular phenomena to anthropologically and anthropometrically staged photographs of representative individuals, sometimes but not always
described as pathological.
Hirschfeld’s identification of his field of sex research with biology was, furthermore, by no means outside the mainstream of German biological thought at the
time. Here the reflections of Charles Minot again become revealing. In the fifth
lecture in his series, Minot explored something that he could only introduce with
the following cliché: “There is probably no phenomenon which has always seemed
to mankind at once so interesting and so mysterious.” That phenomenon was, of
course, sex, and the lecture carried a title that did in fact relate it clearly to a particularly lively sphere of biological investigation at the time: “The Determination
of Sex.” Minot went on, in his introductory remarks, to bring up a bothersome
terminological issue that still rankles today. In both the colloquial and disciplinary
usage of 1912, just as today, sex and sexuality were concepts that related not only
to phenotypic dimorphisms and chromosomal structures, but also to the varied
behaviors of organisms related to reproduction and the physiology of the reproductive system. Minot surmised that “the basis of all clear thinking in regard to the
questions of sex is the difference between sex and sexuality.” By “sex” and “sexual-
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ity,” however, he does not immediately denote sexual behavior here. “Sex” is a characteristic of individual male and female organisms and their bodies, and “sexuality”
is a description of the “reduced number of chromosomes” in the gametes produced
by these individual organisms. Importantly, this distinction has also only emerged
through the scientific investigation, and Minot claims that “by the application of
the microscope we have discovered sexuality proper.”
Despite this unambiguous investigational claim, Minot’s language does not
exclude the interpretation of sex and sexuality as terms relating to behavior. He also
certainly did not exaggerate the importance of sex difference in scientific practice
at that time. He was, however, particularly thorough in his attempts to make the
exploration of sex and sexuality a question of disciplinary investigation. Minot thus
chose specifically to make cellular phenomena the basis of his claims. Other biological scientists of the time were more willing to speak overtly of this uncomfortable
physiological and behavioral dualism in the understanding of sex and sexuality.
Hirschfeld, especially in his congruent interest in—and linking of—sex research
and eugenics, richly represents the complex valences of biologically based publicity, persuasion, and advocacy within and beyond disciplinary contexts in the early
twentieth century.

Homosexuality, Race Hygiene, and Biological Disciplinarity
The phenomenon of homosexuality and its varied behaviors as scientific object
richly demonstrates how these moves toward disciplinization pursued by groups
of investigators attempting to establish themselves as authoritative came into conflict in the sphere of persuasive practice. The invention of the diagnostic category
“homosexuality” during the nineteenth century has, at least since the first volume
of Foucault’s History of Sexuality, been understood as a narrative of discipline. Particularly in its German branches, this narrative is a constitutive part of the history
of the development of academic organization. The two disciplines in which the investigation of homosexuality first grew were medicine and law. Foundational documents of the analysis of homosexual behavior like Johann Ludwig Casper’s Clinical
Reports (Klinische Novellen) (1863) and Handbook of Forensic Medicine (Handbuch
der gerichtlichen Medizin) (1857) emerged precisely in forensic psychiatry, the intersection of medicine and law. In his Handbook’s third edition of 1860, Casper even
divided the two volumes between the “biological” and the “thanatological.” Here,
of course, the division is broadly between the living—the biological—and the dead.
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Sexuality and homosexuality (though Casper does not yet call it that) are therefore
biological issues for him.
From this moment to well into the twentieth century, the potential of biological
methods and disciplines to provide a total explanation of human behavior—and
potential new means for its disciplinary control—made biology the primary disciplinary trope for the investigation of homosexuality. At the same time, the problem
of the explanation of homosexuality reveals the tensions that kept German biology
from coalescing into a single and authoritative disciplinary network, and caused
a proliferation of competing subdisciplinary developments and accretions. Competing explanations of homosexuality in fact became the most important locus of
persuasive practice among two interest groups central to disciplinization moves in
race hygiene and sex research. The first of these was the Society for Race Hygiene
(Gesellschaft für Rassenhygiene) that emerged in 1905 from the journal entitled
Archiv für Rassen- und Gesellschaftsbiologie (Archive for Racial and Social Biology),
founded in 1904 and led by Alfred Ploetz, Ernst Rüdin, and Richard Thurnwald.
I will henceforth employ the term “Archive circle” to refer to this close-knit but
widely varied group of advocates. The second group was constituted by Hirschfeld
himself, and to some extent the circle of scholars and commentators around him
that advocated for sex research and social justice. In 1919, this group took on a more
solid disciplinary form through Hirschfeld’s Institute for Sexual Science in Berlin.
Henceforth I will call them the “Hirschfeld circle.”
In the earlier nineteenth century in Germany, the empirical investigation of
human life and diversity marked by the term biology developed increasingly powerful and persuasive institutional and disciplinary structures. In the biological
sphere a number of loci of argument developed in competition with one another.
Two in particular stand out: the diagnostic and the narrative. The diagnostic strand
attempted to organize the forms of diversity, including especially pathology and
race, into categories independent of time. Diagnostic explanation sought a sophisticated description of what is, placing the object of investigation directly before
the senses, tools, and methods of the investigator. This was the dominant strand of
biological argument from the development of early cell theories in the 1830s until
the dissemination of Darwinism in the 1860s and 1870s. In it biology manifested
the roots in medicine that had been growing since the first instances of the wide
dissemination of the concept of biology in the later German Enlightenment among
scholars and physicians like Karl Friedrich Burdach and Gottfried Treviranus.
The early medical, psychiatric, and forensic investigators of homosexuality
after Casper hewed closely to these diagnostic moments of argument, and could
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therefore see their work as both medical and biological at once. The range of work
on homosexuality by psychiatrists including Westphal, Kraepelin, Krafft-Ebing,
Schrenk-Notzing, Tardieu, Morel, Binet, Eulenburg, Löwenfeld, and Forel takes
place largely within this diagnostic mode, emphasizing time-independent physiological and neurological etiologies and manifestations of homosexuality.
The dissemination of Darwinism in Germany, however, revived a strain of argument that was advanced in competition with the diagnostic by a range of biological
scholars: the narrative. Narrative forms of argument foregrounded the temporal
and contingent character of the living object of inquiry: its determinants and that
which it determines. Narrative explanation was thus often subjunctive, addressing that which might have been and that which could result, and often attributed
purpose and purposiveness to this chain of contingency. The morphological and
teleomechanist traditions of the period before 1840 explored by Timothy Lenoir,
Stephen Jay Gould, and Robert Richards first grounded the tropes of this mode
of argument. The powerful experimental and observational methods of the laboratory, the museum, and the clinic, with their focus on the object at hand, often
seemed to best support the diagnostic strain. Nonetheless the narrative strain
gained power through the later nineteenth century through the efforts of scholarly
partisans of evolutionary theory—and especially the work of Ernst Haeckel. Haeckel, the central public figure in many of these debates, claimed that biology was
specifically a historical science and not a laboratory one, because living phenomena
are fundamentally time-contingent, and because current living forms can only be
understood as one part of a long chain of historical causality and future contingency. Scholars and thinkers as widely varied as Friedrich Nietzsche and Sigmund
Freud took elements of this narrative mode of biological argument and developed
them into wholly new scholarly tropes.
After about 1870, a new generation of biologists trained not in medicine but in
the biological sciences by the generation of Haeckel and Virchow was increasingly
seeking to establish itself and its interests in branches of the academic economy.
Many of them could not map their interests or their work cleanly or comfortably
onto the diagnostic or the narrative—and in their attempts to represent their innovative potential, they sought new persuasive strategies. They therefore attempted to
establish and institutionalize subdisciplines in which the diagnostic and narrative
strains of argument could be reconciled. Heredity was the key concept that immediately demanded elements of both diagnostic and narrative argument, and which
therefore drove many attempts at disciplinization. Heredity marked the pursuit of
mechanisms, causes, and determinants of the forms of life in future generations. It
also required a focus on reproductive mechanisms and behaviors. The race hygiene
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of the Archive circle and the sex research of the Hirschfeld circle were both part of
this proliferation of hereditarian argument immediately around 1900.
Heredity was a constitutive concept for both subdisciplines, allowing them to
make arguments from traditional positions of both diagnosis and narrative. Both
also engaged, however, with a further concept that itself demanded reconciliation
with hereditarian thought. This was the concept of hygiene. A diffuse and nondisciplinary conceptual field in the nineteenth century, hygiene had developed as a
means of making future-oriented arguments from diagnostic standpoints in the
present, especially as microbial, bacteriological, and microscopic techniques and
arguments advanced rapidly in the later nineteenth century. It was therefore a kind
of political medicine that flirted with the temporal arguments of biological narrative, but with less interest in historical and evolutionary determinants. Leading
figures in biological diagnosis like Rudolf Virchow made constitutive contributions
to hygiene as a system of persuasive practice linking medicine, biology, and politics.
A further moment of argument related in part to hygiene was particularly significant in the construction of race hygiene: the issue of value. Building on a long
tradition of German philosophical argument about judgment with roots in aesthetics and in Kantian categories and ethics, the race hygienists (and especially the
Archive circle, foremost among them Fritz Lenz) argued that especially in biology,
values are prior to scientific inquiry, and thus that biological knowledge is contingent on established values and their associated judgments. This discourse of values enabled the race biologists to speak of “race welfare” as the foundational value
structure of both scientific inquiry and political action. The conflicts between race
hygiene and sex research thus provide vast evidence of persuasive practice in the
proliferating field of biological subdisciplines around 1900. I argue that they were
in fact so closely linked by their forms of persuasive practice, by their claims to scientific legitimacy through biological claims, and by their conflicts with one another
that they must be seen as two parts of the same field of disciplinary advocacy.
Race hygiene and sex research both claimed to be the appropriate site of the
reconciliation not only of diagnosis and narrative, but also of heredity and hygiene.
Both inquired into the diversity of human forms and behaviors, but specifically as
a means of establishing arguments that could guide action and policy. They also
claimed both to define and to represent biology itself, insisting that their own methods, results, and policy prescriptions were the best-founded in biological knowledge. Arguments and interests in both fields paralleled one another strongly, and
individual scholars and their chosen tropes of argument crossed the boundaries
between them in both directions. Among race hygienists, these arguments took the
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form of critiques of the investigational and persuasive practices of the sex researchers, fears that the sex researchers were skewing the purpose and goals of hygiene,
and claims that sex research could not be legitimate because it evinced comparatively little interest in race as a determinant of behavior. Among sex researchers,
these arguments took a curiously different form, including critiques of the race
hygienists’ inordinate interest in surface phenomena of human diversity, but in
many respects accepting, defending, and often vigorously advocating “eugenic”
ideas in contrast to or competition with “race hygiene.”
Extraordinary evidence for these claims about the interlocking debates on the
etiology, significance, and hygienic status of homosexuality pursued by the Archive
circle and Hirschfeld’s derives from a group of related articles in the Archiv für
Rassen- und Gesellschaftsbiologie (hereafter Archiv) in the years from 1904 to 1916
that were contributed primarily by the leading founders and editors of the journal: Ernst Rüdin, Otto Ammon, Alfred Ploetz, Fritz Lenz, and August Forel. The
final article of the group, remarkably, was contributed from outside the Archive
circle by a biologist of great institutional prestige: Richard Goldschmidt, a director
of the Kaiser Wilhelm Institute for Biology in Berlin-Dahlem. The arguments in
these articles in the Archiv addressed materials by sex researchers including Magnus Hirschfeld, Benedict Friedlaender, Emil Kraepelin, Richard von Krafft-Ebing,
Ivan Bloch, and Albert Moll, some of whom answered directly the claims made by
the Archive circle.
Four articles or sets of exchanges in the Archiv between the founding of the
journal in 1904 and 1916 show how the issue of homosexuality motivated the persuasive practice of the Archive circle. The first is in the very first issue of the journal,
dated January 1904. It includes a large article by the psychiatrist Ernst Rüdin (a student of Eugen Bleuler und Emil Kraepelin and later the chief editor of the Archiv)
on homosexuality and the “life processes of race.” Rüdin’s article stimulated a
rebuttal by Benedict Friedlaender, a scholar associated with Magnus Hirschfeld’s
Wissenschaftlich-humanitäres Komitee (but who differed strongly with Hirschfeld
over the question of the existence of sexual intermediates) that was published in
the second issue of the journal. Friedlaender’s rebuttal was accompanied, in typical Archiv fashion, by a further response from Rüdin. Five years later, in 1909,
the race biologist (Sozialanthropologe) Otto Ammon (prompted in part by Alfred
Ploetz, the founder of the Archiv) stimulated a major controversy among the Archiv
scholars themselves with an article about evolution, homosexuality, and masturbation. Ammon’s article provoked a series of energetic responses from Ernst Rüdin
and August Forel. In 1912, another future chief editor of the Archiv, the young
Fritz Lenz, produced an article on the heredity of sex-linked traits and pathologies
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that participated, though in a subtle and coded fashion, in the Archiv’s discursive
patterns of inquiry into homosexuality. Finally, in 1916, Richard Goldschmidt
extensively revisited the literature on homosexuality in the light of the problem
of intersexuality—which he considered well demonstrated from his work on the
gypsy moth Lymantria dispar. Goldschmidt was the only one of these scholars
who could claim to be a practicing biologist, rather than a biologically interested
medical doctor or anthropological researcher. His article—pitched clearly toward
an audience of both disciplinary experts and those committed to the Archive circle’s rhetoric of race hygiene—therefore participated in the same kind of persuasive
practice as the Archive circle, but the disciplinary authority of his investigational
claims as the word and practice of academic biology largely dissolved the immediate conflicts about disciplinarity that had stimulated the Archive circle’s interest in
homosexuality in the first place.
Several moments of persuasive practice conceptually subordinate to heredity
and hygiene motivated this inquiry into homosexuality, including the question of
degeneration and the problem of the legal regulation of sexual and reproductive
behavior. The crucial issue in the circle’s interest in homosexuality was, however,
precisely the question of discipline: how a kind of scientific inquiry into homosexuality could be pursued that might reveal its causes through investigation and
ground a consistent persuasive practice relating to reproductive and eugenic policy.
Such inquiry would incorporate the arguments of forensic psychiatry, law, medicine, and also several biological subdisciplines, enabling the writing together of
both diagnosis and narrative. This meant that the Archiv scholars could not engage
simple discourses of the repression or the proscription of homosexuality. Rüdin, in
fact, led the way immediately in 1904 in arguing that paragraph 175 of the imperial penal code—the ban on “lewd and lascivious acts between males”—should in
fact be repealed. This was not for the reasons enumerated by sex researchers like
Hirschfeld, however, which focused on claims of justice or civil rights, but largely
on questions of social hygiene and eugenics like the prevention of blackmail and
marriages by homosexuals. Rüdin’s claims were rather part of the Archive circle’s
race hygiene arguments that homosexuality endangered the discipline of sex as the
mechanism of the transmission of eugenically valued and selected traits to subsequent generations—and that legal proscriptions were meaningless and immaterial
to these eugenic values. The potential that homosexuality represented sexual acts
conducted for their own sake, with no attention to eugenic or reproductive considerations, meant that it was the necessary first locus of the discipline of sex as
reproductive behavior through biological inquiry and argument. A further benefit
to the Archive circle of this strategy was that it could undermine the legitimacy of
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sex research as a discipline by both co-opting and contradicting its methods and
arguments. Here we begin to see how both the Archive circle and the sex researchers attempted to stake out the same elements of persuasive practice as their own.
The Archive circle’s strategy of achieving authority over questions of homosexuality had one particularly common refrain: the argument that their work was “biological.” Rüdin and Ammon specifically begin their articles by arguing that biology
is the appropriate and adequate disciplinary locus of inquiry into homosexuality,
and Lenz does so in his usual coded fashion—he was, after all, only one year past
his medical examinations at Freiburg. Rüdin and Ammon denigrate medical interest in the question and lament journalistic treatments. Rüdin sets the tone with the
following statement:
Even if those varieties of sexual activity that doubtless exist within the general spectrum
of health are undeniably assigned to the field of scientifically biological investigation,
objective explanations of the sexual perversions and inversions . . . remain buried in
textbooks, monographs, and scholarly journals in medicine, or are on the other hand
the object of the most despicable journalistic speculation.

Ammon repeats this language in a close paraphrase: “Recently more than usually
the daily press has concerned itself with discussions about homosexuality and its
origin. . . . The strictly scholarly investigations of homosexuality [however] stand
hidden in psychiatric books and journals.” Ammon chooses the discipline of
Anthropologie, rather than biology, as his preferred locus of inquiry. This is to be
understood, however, as a synonym for race hygiene in the sense of Gobineau and
Chamberlain and as a vestige of Ammon’s archaic language, rather than advanced
age. Goldschmidt, of course, the credentialed, academically sanctioned, and institutionally secure biologist, stakes the clearest claim to biology as his master trope
of argument. He claims that inquiry into homosexuality has been disciplinarily diffuse, but that the time has arrived that many insights “can now be grasped precisely
biologically” (jetzt präzis biologisch gefaßt werden können).
Focus on biology as the appropriate scene of the discipline of homosexuality
must of course take place in the mainstream of persuasive practice in biology of
the time. The Archive circle thus participates in the writing together of diagnosis
and narrative through heredity and hygiene. Rüdin does this directly as part of
his critique of medicine, demanding that hygiene be seen not as focused on the
well-being of the individual, but rather on the well-being of the race. He further
focuses a critique of Magnus Hirschfeld’s “Causes and Character of Uranism [Male
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Homosexuality]” (“Ursachen und Wesen des Uranismus”) around Hirschfeld’s
chapter “Heredity and Homosexuality” (“Heredität und Homosexualität”), concentrating directly on his own reading of heredity as the transmission of valued
traits across time. Ammon takes a similar but less rigorous tack, using the concept of inheritance (erben/Vererbung) so loosely that it becomes a marker for transmission not only through sexual reproduction, but also through suggestion. In a
discussion of the “vice” (Laster) of the French Foreign Legion, he claims that “the
vice is passed down [‘inherited forward’] and new recruits are informed of it” (Das
Laster erbt sich fort und wird den Neueintretenden mitgeteilt). Ammon’s less than
rigorous Lamarckism is obvious here, but must of course itself remain unspoken,
because Ammon has forced the concept of inheritance outside the bounds of sexual
reproduction and into the discussion of sexuality independent of reproduction. He
has done so with the specific goal of demonstrating the evolutionary impossibility
of innate homosexuality as the basis for his argument that all homosexuality is
acquired through masturbation.
Lenz’s attitudes come only at the end of his lengthy article, in his claim that
the “Nordic race” (nordische Rasse) demonstrates the strongest sexual dimorphism,
and in snide footnotes like the following: “One should not misunderstand me. I
recommend to no one that he should cause his own destruction, should he wish to
be anything less than a whole man; I ascertain only a fact.”
Goldschmidt dissolves the basis of the debate with his disciplinarily authoritative article from the perspective of the biologist. He concludes as follows:
From the foregoing we can conclude that two logical conclusions must be drawn from
the biological facts: 1. There is genetic sex that need not, however, correspond with that
of the glands. It is exclusively determined by chromosomal relationships at fertilization.
2. There exists a true physical and psychic intersexuality of all gradations.

Thus Goldschmidt regards legal attempts to ascribe intersexual human beings to
one sex or another as false and ungrounded.
The stakes of these debates in the Archiv für Rassen- und Gesellschaftsbiologie
point to the stakes involved in the investigation of homosexuality in numerous
fields in the later nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. These are disciplinary
stakes, and the Archive circle pursues, in Foucault’s phrase, a “putting into discourse of sex” as claims to disciplinary authority. The field on which they focused,
and for which they attempted to compete with other groups like the sex researchers, was a field that itself was often in need of discipline: biology.
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Conclusion in Berlin
A forced resolution of these debates took two more decades and was achieved not
in the sphere of scientific inquiry and publicity, but through the political. At the
very moment—10 May 1933—that the library and papers of Hirschfeld’s Institute
for Sexual Science were providing fuel for the great book-burning on the Berlin
Opernplatz, Ernst Rüdin was assisting with the preparation of drafts of the National Socialists’ Law for the Prevention of Genetically Diseased Offspring (Gesetz zur Verhütung erbkranken Nachwuchses), which was passed into law on 14 July
1933, and for the first time in German history allowed—and mandated in various
cases—sterilization of individuals judged inferior. Hirschfeld was already in exile,
never again to return to Germany. His plaintive—and posthumous—last publicistic
blast against racial thinking in its many different forms, the publication of his book
Racism in 1938, could do little to stem the Nazis’ tsunami of biologistic rhetoric
justifying increasingly genocidal policies and actions. Despite the conflicted and
multivalent character of Hirschfeld’s work and his willingness to embrace rapidly
and sometimes uncritically a wide spectrum of scientific concepts and ideas that
would lose their persuasive power over time and even come eventually to be seen
as exploitative or destructive, his savvy and layered forms of practice, as well his
commitment—in part—to a vision of stronger social justice for some, if not all,
retains some model character into our own time.
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